Neural response to the observable self in social anxiety disorder by Pujol Nuez, Jesús et al.
Neural response to the observable self in social
anxiety disorder
J. Pujol1*, M. Gime´nez1, H. Ortiz1, C. Soriano-Mas2,3, M. Lo´pez-Sola`1,3, M. Farre´4,5, J. Deus1,6,
E. Merlo-Pich7, B. J. Harrison8, N. Cardoner2,3, R. Navine´s4,9 and R. Martı´n-Santos9,10
1 Institut d’Alta Tecnologia-PRBB, CRC Mar, Hospital de Mar, Barcelona, Spain; 2 Department of Psychiatry, Bellvitge University
Hospital-IDIBELL, Barcelona, Spain; 3 Carlos III Health Institute, Ministry of Science and Innovation, CIBERSAM, Spain;
4 Human Pharmacology and Neurosciences, Hospital del Mar Research Institute (IMIM), Red RTA, Barcelona, Spain; 5 Department of
Pharmacology, Therapeutics, and Toxicology, School of Medicine, Autonomous University of Barcelona, Spain; 6 Department of Clinical and
Health Psychology, Autonomous University of Barcelona, Spain; 7 Neuronal Targets DPU, Respiratory CEDD, GlaxoSmithKline SpA, King of
Prussia, PA, USA; 8 Melbourne Neuropsychiatry Centre, Department of Psychiatry, The University of Melbourne, Australia; 9 Clinical Institute of
Neuroscience, Hospital Clı´nic-IDIBAPS, CIBERSAM, Barcelona, Spain; 10 Department of Psychiatry and Clinical Psychobiology, University of
Barcelona, Spain
Background. Distorted images of the observable self are considered crucial in the development and maintenance of
social anxiety. We generated an experimental situation in which participants viewed themselves from an observer’s
perspective when exposed to scrutiny and evaluation by others.
Method. Twenty patients with social anxiety disorder (SAD) and 20 control subjects were assessed using functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) during the public exposure of pre-recorded videos in which they were each
shown performing a verbal task. The examiners acted as the audience in the experiment and rated performance.
Whole-brain functional maps were computed using Statistical Parametric Mapping.
Results. Robust activation was observed in regions related to self-face recognition, emotional response and general
arousal in both study groups. Patients showed signiﬁcantly greater activation only in the primary visual cortex. By
contrast, they showed signiﬁcant deactivation or smaller activation in dorsal frontoparietal and anterior cingulate
cortices relevant to the cognitive control of negative emotion. Task-related anxiety ratings revealed a pattern of
negative correlation with activation in this frontoparietal/cingulate network. Importantly, the relationship between
social anxiety scores and neural response showed an inverted-U function with positive correlations in the lower score
range and negative correlations in the higher range.
Conclusions. Our ﬁndings suggest that exposure to scrutiny and evaluation in SAD may be associated with changes
in cortical systems mediating the cognitive components of anxiety. Disorder severity seems to be relevant in shaping
the neural response pattern, which is distinctively characterized by a reduced cortical response in the most severe
cases.
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Introduction
Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is deﬁned by a marked
fear of social or performance situations in which the
person is exposed to scrutiny by others (AMA, 2000).
From a cognitive-behavioral viewpoint, entering a
feared social situation enhances negative aspects of
self-perception in SAD patients, such that distorted
images of the observable self are considered crucial to
the development and maintenance of social phobia
(Clark & Wells, 1995 ; Roth & Heimberg, 2001). In
essence, SAD patients do not ultimately fear the
audience when exposed, but rather fear the notion of
the observable self as a target for disapproval (Roth &
Heimberg, 2001).
In the current functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) study, we assessed the neural
response of patients to self-recognition when exposed
to scrutiny and evaluation by others. Speciﬁcally, the
experiment involved presenting patients with pre-
recorded video sequences of themselves performing a
verbal task, in a session during which the examiners
acted as the audience and rated performance. We
anticipated that the neural response in this situation
would involve robust activation of distributed brain
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regions in most subjects (with and without SAD).
Indeed, simple visual recognition of one’s own face is
associated with the activation of a complex cortical
network involving the inferior occipito-temporal
cortex, inferior frontal and parietal cortices, the medial
frontal gyrus and the anterior cingulate cortex
(Devue & Bre´dart, 2011). We also expected that a
potentially tense scrutiny situation would lead to
relevant engagement of emotion and arousal systems
corresponding with the activation of the amygdala
and the thalamus in addition to the insular, cingulate
and prefrontal cortices (Barrett et al. 2007).
In SAD patients, a larger neural response would
be expected if a positive correlation between gener-
ated anxiety and brain activation were assumed.
Nevertheless, previous research using symptom
provocation tasks suggests that this may be not the
case for all brain regions. Indeed, although public
speaking did produce larger activation in subcortical
structures and amygdala in SAD patients, they
showed a reduced cortical response compared
with control subjects involving areas devoted to the
evaluative processes of emotion (Tillfors et al. 2001 ;
Lorberbaum et al. 2004). Similarly, imagining socially
threatening situations was associated with reduced
cortical activity in SAD patients (Kilts et al. 2006 ;
Nakao et al. 2011). Of note, confronting patients with
negative self-beliefs (Goldin et al. 2009b) and ﬁrst-
person negative appraisals (Blair et al. 2011) has also
been associated with reduced early activation in
cortical areas related to emotion cognitive control.
Finally, in an exploratory study with no control
subjects, SAD patients showed decreased activity in
frontal and occipital cortices during a video exposure
of recorded performance similar to our task when
compared with the exposition of a stranger (Van
Ameringen et al. 2004).
The paradoxical absence of a generalized brain
activity increases during speciﬁc symptom provo-
cation in SAD contrasts with a more consistent re-
sponse enhancement observed when relatively milder
emotional stimulation paradigms have been used,
such as the processing of emotional faces (Etkin &
Wager, 2007), general emotional pictures (Shah et al.
2009), phobic-related words (Schmidt et al. 2010) and
emotional prosody (Quadﬂieg et al. 2008). In general,
previous imaging data suggest that SAD patients
show a pattern of increased response to milder
emotional stimulation in basic emotional domains and
a combination of topographically segregated increases
and decreases in activity in response to more intense
socially relevant provocation.
In the context of our task, we predicted that SAD
patients overall would not show a generally higher
response in relation to control subjects. Instead, we
anticipated that patients would demonstrate a combi-
nation of activation increases in systems mediating
emotional reactions (Tillfors et al. 2001), together with
reduced activation of cortical areas promoting the
cognitive control of anxiety (Bishop et al. 2004).
Therefore, our aim was to use fMRI to investigate the
extent to which our task diﬀerentially engages both
components in 20 SAD patients and 20 control sub-
jects. The continuous recording of heart rate was used
as a representative measurement of the physiological
response. Whole-brain functional maps were gener-
ated for task-related activation and for correlations
with anxiety measurements. We also conducted an
out-of-scanner behavioral experiment to further
characterize the nature of the provoked anxiety and to
rule out possible gaze avoidance strategies.
Method
Participants
A total of 20 patients with generalized SAD were re-
cruited through public media advertisement (local
newspapers and poster advertisements). Participants
contacted the study center (Pharmacology Research
Unit) by email and then a clinical researcher per-
formed a preliminary interview by telephone. A
screening visit was performed thereafter to conﬁrm
inclusion/exclusion criteria and good physical health
by a complete physical examination. Inclusion criteria
were : (a) out-patients with a primary psychiatric
diagnosis of generalized SAD according to DSM-IV-
TR criteria (APA, 2000) in conjunction with the Mini
International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI;
Sheehan & Lecrubier, 1999), (b) a Liebowitz Social
Anxiety Scale (LSAS; Liebowitz, 1987) scoreo50, and
(c) participants aged between 18 and 60 years. Patients
with relevant medical or neurological disorders, or
other DSM-IV Axis I disorders, were not considered
for inclusion. All subjects were free of any history
of substance dependence or current substance abuse,
and all provided a negative urine toxicity and breath
alcohol screen. In addition, subjects receiving any
current psychotherapy or pharmacological treatment
were not included. The ﬁnally selected sample
represents a notably homogeneous SAD group of
generalized type (no cases showing only performance-
related SAD were included) with childhood onset of
symptoms and signiﬁcant distress and interference in
the patient’s life, but with no current treatment
that could confound the study results. A group of
20 healthy volunteers matched by age, educational
status and gender distribution were recruited.
These control participants satisﬁed the same health
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conditions and also showed negative results in the
toxicity screen. All participants were right-handed.
Detailed behavioral assessments included the LSAS
(Liebowitz, 1987), the State–Trait Anxiety Inventory
(STAI ; Spielberger, 1983) and 0–100-mm visual
analogue scales (VAS) as ratings of state anxiety,
the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HAMD;
Hamilton, 1960), the Patient Health Questionnaire
(PHQ; Spitzer et al. 1999) and the Clinical Global
Impression – Severity Scale (CGI-S ; Guy, 1976). The
characteristics of both study groups are described in
Table 1. Written informed consent was obtained from
all participants. The study was approved by the local
ethics committee (CEIC-IMAS, Barcelona) and was in
compliance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
fMRI experiment
Experimental task
Before scanning, participants’ verbal task perform-
ances were video-recorded privately in a laboratory
setting. They underwent a memory task adapted from
the Wechsler Memory Scale – Revised (Wechsler,
1987), which involves a single presentation of verbal
narratives to be recalled immediately. Subjects were
asked to listen to and repeat aloud three stories.
During each repetition, video sequences of 30-s
duration were recorded at a short distance. Public
exposure to the video segments occurred only during
the fMRI session when both the subject and the
research team viewed the scenes. Participants were
informed that a clinical psychologist would evaluate
their memory performance during the imaging session
according to formal guidelines. As a control condition,
equivalent video segments featuring unknown ‘other ’
subjects responding to the same stories were used.
These ‘others ’ were matched in terms of age and
gender to each individual study participant. We
maintained a stable background (neutral white color)
and framing (ﬁxed general short plane) in all videos,
and avoided possible distracters such as loud colors
for clothes, hairstyle or accessories (large pendants or
earrings).
In total, the fMRI experiment consisted of six alter-
nating 30-s blocks of the control (other) and exper-
imental (self) conditions. It is important to note that
the experiment required no actual performance during
scanning. In this way, the neural response shows no
inﬂuence from actions and mental operations related
to performance. This may facilitate the interpretation
of results and provide data less aﬀected by head mo-
tion artifacts. Total recall execution scores during
the videos were not collected, as the task ﬁnished
once a 30-s video was successfully recorded. To assess
Table 1. Characteristics of subject populations
SAD patients
(n=20)
Control subjects
(n=20) p
Age (years), mean (S.D.) 24.2 (5.2) 24.4 (5.6) 0.87
Gender (M/F) 5/15 6/14 0.72
Education : superior level, n (%) 20 (100) 20 (100) –
Age of onset (years), mean (S.D.) 9.7 (5.1) – –
Illness duration (years), mean (S.D.) 14.6 (7.2) – –
LSAS score, mean (S.D.) 80.7 (16.2) 11.8 (8.5) <0.0005
STAI-S score, mean (S.D.) 30.8 (8.7) 7.8 (5.9) <0.0005
State anxiety VAS, mean (S.D.)
Before fMRI session 54.5 (19.8) – –
After fMRI session 40.1 (21.9) – –
HAMD-17 score, mean (S.D.) 3.1 (2.2) – –
PHQ-15 score, mean (S.D.) 5.1 (3.5) – –
CGI-S score, n (%) –
Moderately ill 6 (30) – –
Markedly ill 9 (45) – –
Severely ill 5 (25) – –
SAD, Social anxiety disorder ; M, male ; F, female ; LSAS, Liebowitz Social
Anxiety Scale ; STAI-S, State–Trait Anxiety Inventory – State ; VAS, visual analogue
scale ; fMRI, functional magnetic resonance imaging ; HAMD-17, 17-item Hamilton
Rating Scale for Depression ; PHQ-15, 15-item Patient Health Questionnaire ;
CGI-S, Clinical Global Impression – Severity Scale ; S.D., standard deviation.
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the quality of execution, we considered relevant,
that participants were talking during most (80%)
of the recording periods. That is, periods of silence
during recording never exceeded 20% of the time.
Experimental and baseline conditions were also
equated in this performance parameter.
Physiological data acquisition
Heart rate was monitored continuously during fMRI
scans using a photoplethysmograph placed on the
left index ﬁnger (Model 4500MRI, Invivo Corp., USA).
The device provided an output signal for each arterial
pulsation that was registered using software devel-
oped in-house on the Labview 8.0 platform (National
Instruments Corp., USA). Scanner trigger pulses were
also registered to allow accurate synchronization of
physiological signals with the fMRI data. Data were
analyzed and plotted using procedures similar to
those reported in a previous study (Caseras et al. 2010).
The beat-to-beat interval was calculated and the
inverse of each interval was designated as the beat-to-
beat heart rate. The evoked response to the exper-
imental (self) condition was calculated as the heart
rate increase in relation to the preceding control
(other) block. Group mean heart rate was also
calculated for each block.
Image acquisition and preprocessing
We used a 1.5-T Signa Excite system (General Electric,
USA) equipped with an eight-channel phased-array
head coil and single-shot echo–planar imaging (EPI)
software. Functional sequences consisted of gradient
recalled acquisition in the steady state [repetition time
(TR)=2000 ms; echo time (TE)=50 ms; pulse an-
gle=90x] within a ﬁeld of view of 24 cm, with a
64r64-pixel matrix and a slice thickness of 4 mm
(interslice gap=1.5 mm). Twenty-two interleaved
slices, parallel to the anterior–posterior commissure
line, were acquired to cover the whole brain. The ﬁrst
four (additional) images in each run were discarded
to allow the magnetization to reach equilibrium. The
fMRI task was generated and timing was controlled
by PresentationTM software (Neurobehavioral Systems
Inc., USA; www.neurobs.com/) and presented to
subjects using MRI-compatible high-resolution gog-
gles and an audio headset (VisuaStim Digital System,
Resonance Technology Inc., USA). fMRI data were
preprocessed and analyzed using the Statistical
Parametric Mapping 5 (SPM5) package, Wellcome
Department of Imaging Neuroscience (www.ﬁl.ion.
ucl.ac.uk/spm/), running on Matlab 7 (The Math-
works Inc., USA). Functional images were realigned
(motion corrected) and spatially warped into the
standardized SPM template space. A full-width at
half-maximum 8-mm Gaussian kernel was used to
smooth the functional images.
fMRI statistical analysis
Single-subject (ﬁrst-level) SPM contrast images were
estimated comparing the ‘self ’ condition with the
‘other ’ condition. For these analyses, the fMRI signal
response at each voxel was modeled using the SPM
canonical hemodynamic response function. The re-
sulting ﬁrst-level contrast images were then carried
forward to subsequent second-level random-eﬀects
(group) analyses. One-sample t-statistic maps were
calculated to obtain task-related activations and deac-
tivations, and two-sample t tests were performed to
map between-group diﬀerences. Voxel-wise analysis
in SPM5 was also performed to map the correlation
between brain activation and both task-related anxiety
ratings and LSAS scores. The task-related anxiety rat-
ings were (i) ‘anxiety before minus anxiety after
scanning’, as a representative measurement of antici-
patory anxiety obtained in the fMRI session day, and
(ii) ‘anxiety during ‘self ’ condition minus anxiety
during ‘other ’ condition’, as a task-evoked anxiety
measurement obtained in the out-of-scanner exper-
iment. A threshold pFDR <0.05 whole-brain corrected
was used in this study. In one-sample t-test maps, only
activations surviving this conservative threshold are
reported. For between-group comparisons and corre-
lation maps, changes involving a minimum cluster
extension of 15 voxels at p<0.001 uncorrected were
also reported, which may provide an optimal balance
between type I and type II errors (Lieberman &
Cunningham, 2009). p<0.01 is used for display
purposes.
Out-of-scanner behavioral experiment
Because of the complexity of the fMRI session
(Gime´nez et al. 2012), the assessment of task behavioral
eﬀects was completed in a separate experiment that
included eye-tracking records to rule out possible
visual avoidance strategies in SAD patients during
symptom provocation (Horley et al. 2003 ; Pujol et al.
2009) (see online Supplementary Method).
Results
fMRI experiment
Brain activation
The neural response to the ‘self ’ versus ‘other ’ con-
dition produced robust activation in regions involved
in self-face recognition (extrastriate visual cortex, right
inferior frontal gyrus and medial frontal gyrus) and
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emotional response/general arousal (bilateral anterior
insula, anterior cingulate cortex, bilateral amygdala,
upper brainstem, thalamus, basal ganglia and cer-
ebellum) in both SAD patients and control subjects.
SAD patients showed additional activation in the
primary visual cortex but the activation in midline
regions was less extensive (Fig. 1, and online
Supplementary Table S1). Signiﬁcant deactivation
during the ‘self ’ condition was observed only in the
patient group in the dorsal prefrontal and parietal
neocortex. The direct between-group comparison
showed no false-discovery rate (FDR)-corrected dif-
ferences. Nevertheless, increased activation in the
primary visual cortex, reduced activation in the
medial frontal gyrus and the anterior cingulate cortex,
and more pronounced deactivation in the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex were identiﬁed in SAD patients
compared to control subjects at p<0.001 uncorrected
(cluster extension>15 voxels) (Fig. 2, Table S1).
Correlation of brain activation with task-related
anxiety ratings
SAD patients showed a notable amount of anxiety
before the fMRI assessment (Table 1). Using
‘anxiety before minus anxiety after scanning’ as a
measurement of anticipatory anxiety, we observed
a negative correlation with cortical activation within
the patient group (p<0.001 uncorrected, cluster
>15 voxels) (Fig. 3a, Table S2). Anxiety ratings ob-
tained in the separate behavioral experiment similarly
showed negative correlations with brain activation,
in this case combining patients and controls in the
measurement of anxiety during ‘self ’ condition minus
anxiety during ‘other ’ condition (Fig. 3b, Table S2).
Of note, in both analyses the areas with negative
correlations implicated the frontoparietal/cingulate
network that showed signiﬁcant deactivation or re-
duced activation during the task in patients.
Correlation of brain activation with social anxiety scores
The correlation between LSAS scores and the observed
brain response showed a clear tendency to diﬀer be-
tween groups. LSAS correlated positively with brain
activation in control subjects in regions where SAD
patients showed negative correlations. The map of the
interaction between groups for the correlation of
LSAS with brain response summarizes this eﬀect
(Fig. 4, Table S3). Regions showing an interaction
eﬀect included the mesencephalic tegmentum, the
thalamus, hypothalamus, ventral striatum, medial and
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Fig. 1. Neural response to the task. Activation one-sample t maps for control subjects (C) and social anxiety disorder (SAD)
patients (P) (top) and deactivation maps for SAD patients (bottom). Deactivation in control subjects did not reach the signiﬁcance
level. The right hemisphere corresponds to the right side of the coronal views and the bottom side of the axial views.
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posterior orbitofrontal cortex, occipitotemporal areas
and the right dorsal (medial and lateral) frontal cortex.
The interaction eﬀect is illustrated with a plot includ-
ing both controls and patients (Fig. 4). For this plot, the
relationship between LSAS and brain activation was
best explained by a quadratic or inverted U-shaped
function (r=0.75, r2=0.56, p<0.00001).
The neural response to symptom provocation
showed a wide activation range in SAD patients as
a function of disorder severity (Fig. 4). In a post-hoc
analysis, patients with the lowest LSAS scores (n=10)
and those with the highest scores (n=10) were separ-
ately compared to the control group (n=20) (online
supplementary Fig. S1). The lower severity group
showed greater activation than controls in posterior
brain areas including the primary visual cortex, fusi-
form gyrus, posterior mesencephalon and the para-
hippocampal gyrus at its junction with the amygdala :
peak activation t=6.32 and p<0.0005 at Montreal
Neurological Institute (MNI) coordinates x=20,
y=x90, z=x8 mm. The higher severity group
showed reduced activation compared to controls in
anterior brain areas including the anterior cingulate
cortex, medial frontal cortex and orbitofrontal cortex
(peak activation t=4.9 and p<0.0005 at x=6, y=36,
z=4) and in the thalamus (t=3.6 and p=0.001 at
x=10, y=x12, z=16).
Physiological monitoring
Recorded heart data were optimal (>95% of beats
registered) for all but three participants who were
subsequently excluded from the analysis (one control
subject and two patients). SAD patients showed a
tendency to lower heart rate during each paradigm
phase ; in terms of the whole experiment, control
subjects showed an average heart rate of 78.8¡10.3
beats/min and SAD patients 72.2¡9.5 beats/min
SAD > Controls
t
4
4
2 2
0 0 t
SAD < Controls
Fig. 2. Between-group diﬀerences in task responses. The right hemisphere corresponds to the right side of the coronal
views and the bottom side of the axial views.
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Fig. 3. Correlation of brain activation with task-related anxiety ratings. (a) Images show the correlation of brain activation
with anticipatory anxiety before functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in 20 patients. (b) Images show the correlation
of brain activation with anxiety provoked by the task in the separate experiment combining patients and control subjects
(total n=30). The right hemisphere corresponds to the right side of the coronal views and the bottom side of the axial views.
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(t=2.0 and p=0.051). The response to the ‘self ’ con-
dition was characterized by an initial increase in heart
rate in control subjects (Fig. S2). This physiological
reaction, however, was mostly absent in SAD patients.
The mean initial (5-s window) heart rate increase
across the three ‘self ’ condition blocks was 1.9¡2.6
beats/min in control subjects and 0.4¡1.1 beats/min
in SAD patients (t=2.4 and p=0.025).
Out-of-scanner behavioral experiment
This experiment conﬁrmed that the exposure to their
own pre-videoed performance generated a signiﬁcant
amount of anxiety in SAD patients (Supplementary
Results and Fig. S3).
Discussion
To investigate a crucial process in the development
and maintenance of social anxiety, we generated an
experimental situation in which participants were
able to see themselves as if viewed from an observer’s
perspective during exposure to scrutiny and evalu-
ation by others. SAD patients were highly sensitive to
the situation, as reﬂected by their behavioral ratings.
However, both groups demonstrated robust activation
in brain regions related to self-face recognition, emo-
tion and general arousal. The patients showed greater
activation than the controls only in primary visual
areas. By contrast, the patients showed deactivation or
smaller activation in dorsal frontoparietal and anterior
cingulate cortices. Task-related anxiety ratings re-
vealed a pattern of negative correlation with acti-
vation in this frontoparietal/cingulate network. Social
anxiety scores were positively correlated with brain
activation in control subjects and negatively in
patients, a pattern that was best explained by an
inverted-U function.
At ﬁrst sight, it may seem paradoxical that a situ-
ation generating relevant stress in SAD patients was
not associated with a generally larger neural response
compared to controls. Nevertheless, previous provo-
cation studies in SAD have reported both activity in-
creases and decreases (Tillfors et al. 2001 ; Lorberbaum
et al. 2004 ; Van Ameringen et al. 2004 ; Kilts et al. 2006 ;
Goldin et al. 2009b ; Blair et al. 2010, 2011 ; Nakao et al.
2011), which would suggest that the brain response to
such situations may be complex and dependent on a
variety of factors, including speciﬁc task character-
istics, clinical phenotype and disorder severity. The
response to public speaking and to its anticipation
was associated with signiﬁcant amygdala activation in
previous reports (Tillfors et al. 2001; Lorberbaum et al.
2004). Our task did indeed cause signiﬁcant amygdala
activation in both study groups, but patients did
not exhibit larger activation than controls. Therefore,
our experimental situation does not seem to generate
a salient response in the basic emotional response
systems in SAD, as has been shown in other contexts
(Tillfors et al. 2001 ; Lorberbaum et al. 2004 ; Blair et al.
2010). The nature of our task (‘ indirect exposure ’,
where the participants are watching themselves after
the fact) may favor more engagement of cognitive
processes, including post-hoc analysis of their own
performance, and less limbic/paralimbic partici-
pation, as opposed to tasks involving live exposure to
public speaking (Tillfors et al. 2001). In contrast with
the lack of overt limbic hyper-response, it is relevant
to note that the largest between-group diﬀerence was
the increase in visual cortex activation in SAD. This
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Fig. 4. Correlation of brain activation with Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS) scores. The map corresponds to the interaction
between groups and displays voxels showing a positive correlation signiﬁcantly greater in control subjects than in patients
(or a negative correlation signiﬁcantly greater in patients than in controls). The right hemisphere corresponds to the right side
of the coronal view and the bottom side of the axial view. The plot illustrates the interaction eﬀect. A quadratic function or an
inverted-U function provided the best explanation for the relationship.
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ﬁnding is in concordance with previous studies pos-
tulating an important role of the visual cortex in
emotional arousal at the perception level (Sabatinelli
et al. 2007, 2012 ; McTeague et al. 2011).
In our assessment, symptom provocation was
not associated with increased psychophysiological
arousal, but instead SAD patients showed reduced
heart rate responses. Several independent research
groups have reported an absence of a signiﬁcant in-
crease in heart rate and other physiological measures
between SAD patients and controls in response to
threatening faces (see Staugaard, 2010 for a review), or
during stressful speaking tasks (Tillfors et al. 2001 ;
Edelmann & Baker, 2002 ; Mauss et al. 2004 ; Heiser
et al. 2009; Schmitz et al. 2011). Physiological arousal,
however, may be relevant in particular patient sub-
groups. For example, signiﬁcant heart rate acceleration
during speech presentation was observed in social
phobia patients who complained of blushing (Gerlach
et al. 2001), elderly socially anxious women (Grossman
et al. 2001), social phobics without associated avoid-
ance personality disorder (Hofmann et al. 1995), and
selective public speaking phobics (as opposed to gen-
eralized social phobia) (Heimberg et al. 1990 ; Levin
et al. 1993). Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize
that diﬀerences between patients and control subjects
have been more consistent for the subjective percep-
tion of physiological reactions than for the reactions
themselves (Gerlach et al. 2001, 2004 ; Grossman et al.
2001 ; Edelmann & Baker, 2002 ; Mauss et al. 2004 ; Wild
et al. 2008), which supports cognitive theories of social
anxiety emphasizing negative interpretation of bodily
sensations as part of the anxiety response (Edelmann
& Baker, 2002 ; Mauss et al. 2004 ; Wild et al. 2008).
Although anxiety may potentially be associated
with either excessive emotional (limbic) reactivity or
its insuﬃcient cognitive (cortical) control (Bishop et al.
2004), the failure of emotion regulation is thought to be
a key feature of SAD (Kilts et al. 2006 ; Goldin et al.
2009b). The eﬀect of cognitive-linguistic regulation of
emotional reactivity to social threat (Goldin et al.
2009a) and to negative self-beliefs (Goldin et al. 2009b)
was explicitly assessed in two diﬀerent experiments.
In both, the authors reported reduced activation in
brain areas related to attention and cognitive control
of emotion in SAD patients compared to healthy con-
trols. This eﬀect may be not generalized to all anxiety
types, as individuals prone to general anxiety (deﬁned
by Spielberger STAI scores) seem instead to engage
prefrontal and anterior cingulate regions more
than healthy controls during the cognitive modulation
of negative emotion (Campbell-Sills et al. 2011). We
observed normal subcortical and limbic response with
reduced activation in cortical areas, a pattern that is
compatible with a failure in the cognitive control of
anxiety. Importantly, we found decreased activation
in SAD patients speciﬁcally in the core of both the
prefrontal and the cingulate systems, which jointly
mediate the cognitive control of negative emotion
through both attention strategies and cognitively
changing the meaning of emotionally evocative stim-
uli (Ochsner & Gross, 2005 ; Phillips et al. 2008).
Research in healthy individuals has demonstrated
the association of higher anxiety levels with less ac-
tivity speciﬁcally in prefrontal and rostral anterior
cingulate cortices in response to threat-related stimu-
lation (Bishop et al. 2004). In our study, both antici-
patory anxiety and anxiety during provocation
showed a negative correlation with activation in pre-
frontal and dorsal anterior cingulate cortices, which
would further support the notion that cognitive
anxiety, as opposed to somatic anxiety, is relevant in
SAD when fear of the observable self is provoked.
Signiﬁcant correlation with anxiety ratings was also
observed in the control group, which suggests that
social anxiety may be associated with a weaker re-
cruitment of top-down control mechanisms across the
entire range of this dimensional disorder. Other
studies in SAD, however, have found a positive
relationship between provoked anxiety and brain re-
sponse in structures more closely related to emotional
reactivity, such as the amygdala (Tillfors et al. 2001)
and the most ventral part of the prefrontal cortex (Kilts
et al. 2006).
A classical concept relates anxiety to better per-
formance accuracy at moderate levels and to worsen-
ing performance when anxiety intensity increases (the
inverted ‘U’ law introduced by Yerkes & Dodson in
1908). In our study, the neural response to symptom
provocation showed similar dynamics. We found a
positive correlation between LSAS severity and brain
activation in the low score range and a negative cor-
relation with higher scores. As a result, the neural
response in the most severe patients was markedly
decreased. Non-linear associations with an inverted
U-shape were observed during anticipatory anxiety to
pain for the anterior cingulate cortex (Straube et al.
2009). In a study assessing a large sample of patients
with lifetime anxiety disorder, anxious arousal
showed a similar non-linear association with cortisol
awakening response (Wardenaar et al. 2011), which is
of interest given that our analysis also implicated the
hypothalamus. An earlier study in healthy volunteers
observed the inverted U-shaped relationship between
anxiety and both cerebral blood ﬂow and cerebral
metabolic rates for glucose (Gur et al. 1987). The
authors proposed a fall in brain activity during high
stress as a physiological explanation of the inverted-U
relationship between anxiety and performance. It may
be of interest in future studies to investigate whether
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the inverted-U dynamics accounts for the experience
of ‘mental block’ frequently reported in highly
anxious subjects during performance.
As a study limitation, we should point out that
the assessment of subjective anxiety during the fMRI
session only involved anticipatory anxiety measure-
ments, whereas a more comprehensive assessment of
anxiety provoked by the task was assessed in a
separate session including only a part of the original
sample. Relevant variations in the clinical status of
these patients between the fMRI session and the
behavioral testing may be expected. Treatment, for
example, could have a direct eﬀect on task perform-
ance. We veriﬁed, however, that substantial treatment
variations did not occur during this period in this
subsample : only one patient received pharmacological
treatment (0.5 mg citalopram a day) and no one re-
ceived psychotherapy.
Another relevant study limitation relates to the po-
tential eﬀect on brain activity of the baseline condition
used (viewing a stranger). This control condition was
also perceived as more anxious in SAD patients
(Table S4) and this is logical because SAD patients
typically fear social interaction. Potential brain acti-
vations associated with increased stress during base-
line in SAD could restrict the detectable activation
range related to the experimental condition. In this
context, the results need to be speciﬁcally interpreted
as the added eﬀect of viewing oneself compared with
viewing a stranger, which was our primary aim
within the framework of cognitive-behavioral models
proposing the enhancement of negative aspects of
self-perception in SAD patients.
It is also important to note that, although the re-
ported ﬁndings are fairly consistent in terms of func-
tional anatomy, group diﬀerences in brain activation
and correlations were only identiﬁed at a lenient
threshold. Future research will help to conﬁrm the
strength of such associations. Similarly, a more com-
prehensive assessment including the entire range of
SAD scores, with more cases covering intermediate
scores, may be useful for deﬁning the inverted-U
correlation in more detail.
In conclusion, self-recognition when exposed to
scrutiny and evaluation by others generated a robust
neural response in regions relevant to emotional
reactivity, but group diﬀerences for the activations
were not evident in these domains. Social anxiety was
more speciﬁcally associated with changes in the dorsal
frontal and cingulate systems mediating top-down
emotion regulation, which may emphasize the rel-
evance of the cognitive component of anxiety in the
disorder. Disorder severity was important in shaping
the neural response pattern, which was characterized
by a clear cortical reduction in the most severe cases.
This observation may help to explain some of the
divergent results that can be found in research studies
of SAD.
Supplementary material
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